Le numéro 9 (juin 2019) de la revue Con-Textos Kantianos est en ligne
Con-Textos
Kantianos (Journal International de
Philosophie) est une revue électronique de philosophie kantienne et d’éthique
en accès libre (ISSN 1130-2097). Le dernier numéro vient de paraître et est accessible à l'adresse suivante: Con-Textos Kantianos
Présentation du projet
Ce projet est né avec une vocation clairement ibéro-américaine, sans renoncer, cependant, à un esprit cosmopolite – ce pourquoi la revue accepte des travaux dans six langues différentes.
Parue en novembre 2014, la revue Con-Textos kantianos (CTK) accueille, dans ses différentes sections, notamment des articles, des entretiens, des notes et discussions, ainsi que des critiques de livres. Cet effort collectif a pour objectif de favoriser une large participation et ce, selon la plus grande pluralité. Cette revue électronique autour des études kantiennes (textes et contextes) a une périodicité semestrielle et publie alternativement des monographies et des numéros au sein desquels sont publiés les travaux qui ont fait l’objet d’une évaluation positive.
Présentation du numéro 9
Le numéro 9 des CTK réunit seize articles (un en français, deux en italien, quatre en espagnol et neuf en anglais). La section «Discussions» rassemble cinq études consacrées à «Kant, el (no)-conceptualismo y los juicios de gusto». Le présent numéro s’achève avec six recensions.
Nous reproduisons ci-après la table des matières du numéro 9 (juin 2019) de Con-Textos Kantianos ainsi que les résumés des articles.
TABLE DES MATIÈRES
«Equipo editor» / «Editorial Team»
«Sumario» / «Table of contents»
Roberto R. Aramayo, «Editorial de CTK 9»
Roberto R. Aramayo, «CTK 9 Editorial Note»
ARTICLES
- Paulo R. Licht dos Santos: La déduction transcendantale dans les Prolégomènes et le problème de l´idéalisme. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/398
Je me propose d'examiner les paragraphes 18 et 19 de la deuxième partie desProlégomènes. Bien que ces deux paragraphes ne constituent pas l'intégralité de la déduction transcendantale des Prolégomènes, ils ont une fonction essentielle dans la mesure où ils exposent l’argument entier in nuce. Ces deux sections établissent de façon claire que la doctrine de l'idéalisme critique, présentée dans la première partie des Prolégomènes comme un idéalisme qui ne supprime pas «l'existence de la chose qui apparaît», joue un rôle indispensable dans la déduction transcendantale, qui est présentée dans la deuxième partie à partir de la distinction entre jugement de perception et jugement d'expérience.
- Terrence Thomson: The Understanding in Transition: Fascicles X, XI and VII of Opus postumum. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/399
This essay investigates the transformation of the faculty of understanding in Kant’s Transition from Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics drafts found in Opus postumum. I argue that in fascicles X and XI Kant implicitly reverses the architectonic order of sensibility and understanding. Without an account of this reversal, Kant’s critique of Isaac Newton’s conception of phenomena and the so called Selbstsetzungslehre (doctrine of self-positing) in fascicle VII fall apart. I argue that what is at stake is a challenge Kant makes to his own presuppositions and a challenge to the Kantian philosopher who wishes to stay with a strictly ‘critical’ Kant.
- Eugenio Moya, Fuerzas, facultades y formas a priori en Kant. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/400
Para el autor de este artículo, el rechazo kantiano de la identificación de su concepto de a priori con la noción leibniciana de lo innato solo puede comprenderse de manera clara y precisa, si recurrimos a la concepción kantiana de la epigénesis como modelo epistemológico; es decir, si consideramos las facultades cognitivas como fuerzas formativas que se componen con otras fuerzas de la naturaleza para hacer posible la adquisición originaria de intuiciones y conceptos a priori.
- Héctor Luis Pacheco Acosta, Kant’s anthropological study of memory. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/401
The aim of this article is to shed light on Kant’s anthropological theory of memory. I shall contrast physiological studies of memory against Kant’s own study. I suggest some ideas about the relation between memory and time, as long as memory has the power to store and reproduce the temporal configuration of our representations. Moreover, I deal with the problem of personal identity and I suggest that memory contributes to the possibility of this identity from a pragmatic point of view. Finally, I hold that Kant’s pragmatic anthropology does not only provide a description of memory for the human being’s self-knowledge but also for the human being’s self-perfection. Thus, such description discloses not only what the human being is but also what this can become, insofar as it is capable of perfecting itself.
- Federico Rampinini, La necessità del gusto e il sensus communis kantiano. A partire da alcune recenti letture. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/402
La nozione di “sensus communis” è una delle nozioni più importanti e allo stesso tempo complesse dell’intera filosofia kantiana. Tale complessità è dovuta alla diversità di significati che essa acquisisce nel corso degli scritti kantiani, i quali non dedicano mai una analisi precipua a questo concetto. Recenti studi, come quelli di Zhengmi Zhouhuang e di Serena Feloj, hanno contribuito a focalizzare l’attenzione su tale nozione, sulla sua importanza e sulle difficoltà ad essa connesse. Proprio a partire dalla discussione di queste interessanti analisi, vorrei proporre una lettura epistemologica del “senso comune”, che tenga conto della molteplicità delle connotazioni che tale nozione di volta in volta assume, senza per questo perdere di vista l’unità e la sistematicità del sistema delle facoltà. Questa nozione a mio giudizio può essere identificata con la stessa facoltà di giudizio: facoltà che nell’esperienza estetica esprime pienamente la sua eautonomia, essendo a sé stessa sia oggetto sia legge. In questa senso la trattazione del “sensus communis” rende più che mai evidente l’importanza e la ricchezza teorica dell’approfondimento delle condizioni trascendentali che ha luogo nella terza Critica.
- Almudena Rivadulla Durán, Freedom and Bonds in Kant. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/405
The thesis that I intend to address in this article can be summarized with the idea that positive bonds engender not only dependence, but also freedom and autonomy. Accordingly, it is worth asking what positive human bonds are based on. Or, to phrase the question another way, how can dependence and autonomy be blended when we talk about relationships in terms of bonds, that is, relationships with a special quality of union?
- Manja Kisner, Kant’s Analogy between the Moral Law and the Law of Nature. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/407
In the Groundwork Kant refers to the analogy between the moral law and the law of nature when clarifying the concept of the categorical imperative. However, in the Groundwork itself, he does not give any further explanation as to why he introduces the analogy. Therefore, I take the Groundwork as a starting point of my article, but then I explicate on the analogy from a broader perspective, focusing especially on his lecture courses Moral Mrongovius II and Naturrecht Feyerabend as well as on his Typic chapter of the second Critique.
- Joris van Gorkom, The Reddish, Iron-Rust Color of the Native Americans. Immanuel Kant’s Racism in Context. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/408
In this essay, I discuss Kant’s views on the “American race.” Robert Bernasconi has pointed out that more research on the sources of Kant’s ideas on non-white races is needed in order to have a better understanding of his racism. This essay responds to that call in order to show how Kant contributed to on-going discussions on the causes and meaning of human differences. However, I will also focus on his influence on his contemporaries. The reason for doing so is two-fold. Firstly, I will question Irene Tucker’s recent attempt to show that skin color was considered a racial sign because of its supposed self-evidence and immediate legibility. By way of a presentation of Kant’s views on the “American race,” I will show that race mixing formed the core of Kant’s racial theory and not the alleged immediacy of racial sight. Secondly, I will focus on his influence in order to question the popular idea that Kant had in his late work developed second thoughts on his racial hierarchy. His appraisal of the work of one of his contemporaries (Christoph Girtanner) clearly shows that the matter is far more complicated than suggested in these interpretations of Kant’s racial work.
- Daniel Paul Dal Monte, Philosophical Grounding For the Moral Law: In Defense of Kant’s Factum der Vernunft (Fact of Reason). Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/409
In this paper, I first explain Slajov Žižek’s analysis of the grounds of Kant’s categorical imperative. I show how Žižek considered the grounds of the categorical imperative to be an example of irrationalism that ran counter to the spirit of the Enlightenment, of which Kant was, ironically, a major proponent. The irrationalism in Kant’s moral law makes him vulnerable to moral skepticism. I go on to counter this interpretation by drawing from Kant’s practical philosophy. I counter the moral skeptic by arguing from moral phenomenology to the existence of a reason that is independent of empirical motivations and so objectively determining. Whatever is objectively determining logically supersedes that which is based on a particular context. The moral law is rooted in the ontology of an independent faculty of reason capable of issuing a universal law. The union of ontology and ethics means that the categorical imperative is not irrational.
- Yohan Molina, Lo incondicionado e irrestricto en Kant o del valor de una buena voluntad. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/411
El presente escrito pretende ser un aporte a la comprensión del singular valor de la buena voluntad según lo descrito en la Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres. Para ello, después de aclarar sucintamente ciertos extravíos conceptuales sobre esta noción, repasaremos dos de las más representativas aproximaciones contemporáneas a la axiología kantiana que, sin embargo, arrojan resultados insatisfactorios al momento de precisar el valor de la voluntad buena: los abordajes de Korsgaard y Sensen. Intentaremos develar dichos fallos y luego replantearemos la distinción entre valor irrestricto e incondicionado para aliviarlos en el marco general de la propuesta de Sensen.
- Sunday Adeniyi Fasoro, Humanity as a Duty to Oneself. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/412
This paper analyses the thorny interpretative puzzle surrounding the connection between humanity and the good will. It discusses this puzzle: if the good will is the only good without qualification, why does Kant claim that humanity is something possessing an absolute value? It explores the answers to this question within Kantian scholarship; answers that emanate from a commitment to the human capacity for freedom and morality and to actual obedience to the moral law. In its final analysis, it endorses Richard Dean’s good will reading as the most reflective of Kant’s ethics. It claims that in order for a person to reach the moral ideal of acting rightly and giving priority to moral law, he must always honour his duties to himself. Accordingly, it argues that before a person can be deemed as an object of respect, he must first respect the right of humanity in his own person.
- Franklin Ibáñez, Perdón, impunidad y el difícil concierto de deberes. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/413
¿Perdonar es un deber? No, si significa la simple liberación de las deudas o debidas sanciones. En cambio, si perdonar se refiere a forjar un carácter indulgente, orientado a la cancelación de odios y rencores para con quienes nos han agraviado, entonces es posible que el sistema moral kantiano pueda justificarlo como deber. En el marco de la «Metafísica de las costumbres», perdonar podría considerarse un deber imperfecto. En ese sentido, sería a la vez compatible con otros deberes, perfectos e imperfectos, como hacer cumplir la justicia o colaborar para que esta se cumpla. Distinguir entre perdón e impunidad constituye una tarea fundamental en contextos de justicia transicional. El artículo sostiene que perdonar es un deber y que este no contradice a la justicia.
- Stefano Cazzanelli, Conocimiento y donación entre Rickert y Heidegger. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/414
En el presente artículo analizamos el problema de la donación en la filosofía neokantiana de Heinrich Rickert y la crítica que Martin Heidegger le dirigió desde el marco de la fenomenología. Gracias a un análisis previo de las estructuras fundamentales de la teoría del conocimiento de Rickert, intentaremos mostrar cómo la interpretación rickertiana de la donación permite captar algunos aspectos esenciales de las diferencias entre Kant y la filosofía transcendental de los valores. Finalmente, mostraremos cómo Heidegger critica la reducción de la donación a una categoría teorética por un lado y extiende su ámbito de aplicación al horizonte preteorético por el otro.
- Roberto R. Aramayo, The Kantian Background to Cassirer’s Political Commitment and Its Parallelisms with Kant’s Republicanism and Support of the French Revolution. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/415
Cassirer’s thought took a radical turn in his mature life, comparable to the one that Kant went through in his last days, and in both cases this was motivated by the political events that they witnessed: the French Revolution in Kant’s case, and the National Socialist ideology in Cassirer’s case. In this work I canvass Cassirer’s way of articulating his own political thought by constantly reclaiming the philosophy of Kant, whose work he never stops referring to, and by constantly reclaiming the values defended by the Enlightenment’s project as a whole, in order to defend, among other things, the idea of a republican constitution and thereby the Weimar Republic. Cassirer decided to fight against Nazism in the field of History of Ideas, choosing Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe as his allies. The second part of this work emphasizes this parallelism by unfolding the premises of Kant’s republicanism.
- Sofia Miguens, Animality and Rationality (On how John McDowell’s Kantian view of moral experience could accommodate research on emotion). Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/416
My main goal in this article is methodological: I want to spell out how a Kantian perspective could accommodate current empirical work on cognition, and in particular on emotion. Having chosen John McDowell as a guide, I try to characterize his view of moral experience and underline its Kantian traits (McDowell 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1998e, 1998f). I start by identifying the conception of freedom as exemplified in the rational wolf thought experiment in Two Forms of Naturalismas the main Kantian trait. I then go through the characterization of two other crucial aspects of our moral experience – (responsiveness to) reasons and value. I suggest that McDowell’s approach to moral experience, although not itself strictly Kantian in all of its details, is an instance of a transformative view of rationality, as defended by Matthew Boyle (Boyle 2016) and that such transformative view is the key to accommodate empirical research on cognition within a Kantian perspective.
- Luigi Imperato, Vita come scopo, scopo della vita: riflessioni sui §§ 79-84 della Critica del Giudizio. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/417
Nel mio articolo propongo una lettura dei §§ 79-84 della Critica del Giudizio, parte della sezione Metodologia del Giudizio teleologico. Dapprima mi interrogo sul significato di una Methodenlehre del Giudizio teleologico, che rintraccio in un’attività metariflessiva del Giudizio; procedo poi ad una lettura analitica del testo nelle sue varie articolazioni, nella quale passo in rassegna le questioni attinenti alla specificità dello statuto epistemologico della teleologia, alla possibile convivenza tra finalismo e meccanicismo nella scienza della natura, all’origine della vita, allo scopo ultimo della natura e allo scopo finale della creazione; approdo, infine, ad un’interpretazione per cui l’intera teleologia rationis humanae, che si estende dalla teleologia naturale alla teleologia morale passando per l’antropologia e per la filosofia della storia, viene in questa sezione riarticolata intorno ad un nuovo fulcro concettuale di livello trascendentale, che può garantire l’effettivo collegamento tra queste diverse parti della filosofia proprio perché esso non si esercita in forma di dominio legislativo, ma in forma di riflessione sul molteplice empirico e sulla causalità teleologica propria dell’uomo.
NOTES ET DISCUSSIONS
- Matías Oroño, Kant, el (no)-conceptualismo y los juicios de gusto. Introducción a una discusión. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/418/654
- Silvia del Luján di Saanza, Comentario al artículo «El (no)-conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto» de Matías Oroño. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/419
- Pedro Stepanenko,
La persistencia de los conceptos. Un comentario sobre una objeción de Matías Oroño a Dietmar Heidemannn. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/420
- Matías Oroño, El conceptualismo de Kant: una lectura del juicio de gusto. Respuesta a mis críticos. Disponible sur: https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/422
RECENSIONS
- Recension de: Meer, R., Der transzendentale Grundsatz der Vernunft. Funktion und Struktur des Anhangs zur Transzendentalen Dialektik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Berlin/Boston, De Gruyter, 2018, par Lara Scaglia
- Recension de: Schulting, D.: Kant's deduction from apperception. An essay on the trascendental deduction of the categories, Berlin/Boston, De Gruyter, 2019, par Alberto López López
- Recension de: Chris L. Firestone, Nathan A. Jacobs, James H. Joiner (eds.), Kant and the Question of Theology, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2017, par Guillermo López Morlanes
- Recension de: Courtney D. Fugate
(ed.), Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics. A Critical Guide, Cambridge Critical Guides, Cambridge University
Press, 2018, par Alba Jiménez
Rodríguez et Alberto Morán Roca
- Recension de: Fan, D., Die Problematik der Interesselosigkeit bei Kant. Eine Studie zur «Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft», Berlin, De Gruyter, 2018, par Guillermo Moreno Tirado
- Recension de: K. Pollok, Kant’s Theory of Normativity. Exploring the Space of Reason, Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 2017, par José Ramón Suárez Villalba
Contact (principal):
Roberto Rodríguez Aramayo
Directeur
IFS-CSIC
C\ Albasanz, 26 (3C21), 28037, Madrid (Espagne)
Adresse de courrier électronique: aramayo@ifs.csic.es